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VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW
VOLUME 3

JUNE, 1950

NUMBER 4

THE GENOCIDE CONVENTION AND THE CONSTITUTION
MYRES S. McDOUGAL* AND RICHARD ARENS-t

Shocked by the Nazis' barbaric mass-murder of millions of Jews, Poles
and Gypsies just because they were Jews, Poles and Gypsies,' a tense world
threatened by new violence seeks in the Genocide Convention to mobilize the
conscience of mankind, to create a new crime, and to outlaw under the laws of
all mankind, the intentional destruction of racial, ethnical, national and religious groups. By this Convention, after recognizing "that at all periods of
history genocide has inflicted great losses on humanity" and "that international
cooperation is required" to "liberate mankind from such an odious scourge," 2
the contracting states "confirm that genocide, whether committed in time of
peace or in time of war, is a crime under international law which they undertake to prevent and to punish." 3 Genocide is defined as "any.of the following
acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical,
racial or religious group, as such": "killing members of the group," "causing
serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group," "deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical
destruction in whole or in part," "imposing measures intended to prevent
births within the group," "forcibly transferring children of the group to
another group." 4 In addition to "genocide," so defined, other acts are made
* William K. Townsend, Professor of Law, Yale Law School.
t

Sterling Graduate Fellow, Yale Law School.

1. The Nazis killed "six million Jews, two and one-half million Slavs and practically
all the Gypsies of Europe." Turlington, The Genocide Convention Should Be Ratified,
in A.B.A. SECTION OF INTERNATIONAL AND COmPARATIVE LAW, PROCEEDINGS 26 (1949).

See also 22 TRIAL OF THE MAJOR WAR CRrIMINALs 491-96 (Nuremberg, 1948); Lemkin,
The U.N. Genocide Convention, 95 CONG. REc. A 1224 (1949).
It is significant that the Nuremberg International Military Tribunal held that it did
not have jurisdiction over these offenses save in cases where they were linked to aggressive war. This immunized the majority of crimes committed before the outbreak of the
war. In the words of the tribunal: "The policy of persecution, repression and murder of
civilians in Germany before the war of 1939, who were likely to be hostile to the Government, was most ruthlessly carried out. The persecution of Jews during the same period
is established beyond all doubt. To constitute crimes against humanity, the acts relied
on before the outbreak of war must have been in execution of, or in connection with,
any crime within the jurisdiction of the Tribunal. The Tribunal is of the opinion that
revolting and horrible as many of these crimes were, it has not been satisfactorily proved
that they were done in execution of, or in connection with, any such crime." 22 TRIAL
OF THE MAJOR WAR CRIMINALS 498 (Nuremberg, 1948).
2. Preamble to CONVENTION ON THE PREVENTION AND PUNISHMENT OF THE CRIME
OF GENOCIDE. The Convention is found in U.N. Doc. A/760/corr. 2, p. 9 (Dec. 3, 1948).
The votes and discussion of the United Nations General Assembly are found in U.N.
Doc. A/PV 178 (Dec. 9, 1948), A/PV 179 (Dec. 9, 1948). The Convention will hereafter be cited by article only.
3. Art. I.
4. Art. II.
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punishable: "conspiracy to commit genocide," "direct and public incitement
to commit genocide," "attempt to commit genocide," and "complicity in genocide." 5 All persons "whether they are constitutionally responsible rulers, public
officials or private individuals" who commit "genocide or any of the other
[enumerated] acts" are to be punished 6 and the "Contracting Parties
undertake to enact, in accordance with their respective Constitutions, the
necessary legislation to give effect" to the Convention and to provide
"effective penalties." 7 Trial is to be "by a competent tribunal of the State in
the territory of which the act was committed, or by such international penal
tribunal as may have jurisdiction with respect to those Contracting Parties
which shall have accepted its jurisdiction." 8 Disputes as to "interpretation,
application or fulfillment" are to be "submitted to the International Court of
Justice at the request of any of the parties to the dispute" 9 and "any Contracting Party may call upon the competent organs of the United Nations to
take such action under the Charter of the United Nations as they consider
appropriate" for prevention or suppression of the crime. 10
Spokesmen for the American Bar Association have urged that this Convention should not be ratified by the United States. At its September, 1949,
meeting in the House of Delegates of the Bar Association resolved "that the
suppression and punishment of Genocide under an international convention
to which it is proposed the United States shall be a party involves important
constitutional questions" and "that the proposed convention raises important
fundamental questions but does not resolve them in a manner consistent with
our form of Government" and, therefore, recommended "that the convention
on Genocide now before the United States Senate be not approved as submitted." 11 This action was based upon a report of the Bar Association's
ironically named Special Committee on Peace and Law Through United
Nations. In this Report the Genocide Convention is condemned and rejected
as a proposal "by the action of the President, consented to by two-thirds of the
Senators present when Senate action is taken, to define certain acts, which
-have traditionally been regarded as domestic crimes, as international crimes
and to obligate the United States to provide for their prevention, suppression
and punishment and for the trial of persons accused thereof either in our
domestic courts or in an international court." 12 From ratification of the
5. Art. III.

6. Art. IV.
7. Art. V.
8. Art. VI.
9. Art. IX.
10. Art. VIII.
11. This resolution appears in A.B.A. SECTION OF INTERNATIONAL AND COMPARATIVE
LAW, REPORT AND RECOmMENDATIONS (1949) and in A.B.A. SPECIAL COMMI1TTEE ON
PEACE AND LAW THROUGH UNITED NATIONS, REPORT (1949).
12. A.B.A. SPECIAL Co.sirm-EE ON PEACE AND LAW THROUGH UNITED NATIONS,
REPORT 10 (1949). Contrast the general tenor of the Report of the Section of International
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Convention the Report imagines a flow of many horribles: "Endless confusion
in the dual system of the United States" would be inevitable, with "the same
crime" being "murder in state law" and "genocide in the federal and international fields," and race riots and lynching being both local crimes and
genocide, depending "on the intent and extent of participation." 13 Freedom
of speech and press might be denied as incitement to genocide. 14 Persons
might be charged with unanticipated criminality because of the imprecision
of "destroy," "mental harm," or, "inwhole or in part." 15 American citizens
might eventually come to be triable "by an international penal tribunal where
they would not be surrounded by the constitutional safeguards and legal
rights accorded persons charged with a domestic crime." 16 And so on. "To
impose a great new body of treaty law which will become the domestic law
of the United States" is described as "a tremendous change in the structure
of the relation of the states and the federal government" of doubtful constitutionality.' 7 "To deprive the states of a great field of criminal jurisprudence
and place it in the federal field alone, or under the jurisdiction of an international court, is," so the Report runs, "truly revolutionary, not to be effected
without an amendment of our Constitution." IsAction by the President and
the Senate, it is even urged in ancillary argument, is of doubtful constitutionality as incompatible with the power of the Congress "to define and punish...
offenses against the law of nations." 19 This country is peculiarly vulnerable,
another theme asserts, because the Convention, if constitutional, must, despite
its express terms, be regarded as self-executing and the law of our land,
20
before other nation-states perform.
In the lead editorial of the last number of the American Journal of International Law the Resolution of the House of Delegates of the American Bar
Association and the Report of the Association's Special Committee on Peace
and Law through United Nations are approved and justified by that Journal's
distinguished Editor-in-Chief, Mr. George A. Finch.2 1 Mr. Finch also finds
that the Genocide Convention undertakes to make "international crimes" of
"a code of domestic crimes," 22- and since the "protection of personal rights is
vested principally in the States of the American Union," "compromises the
system of constitutional law prevailing in the United States." 23 "The ratifiand Comparative Law, supra note 11, though even this Report is somewhat meticulous
in its suggestions of unnecessary reservations.

13. A.B.A.

SPECIAL COMMITTEE ON PEACE AND LAw THROUGH UNITED NATIONS,

12 (1949).
14. Id. at 13.
15. Id. at 15.
16. Id. at 12.
17. Ibid.
18. Ibid.
19. Id. at 14.
20. Id. at 12.
21. 43 Am. J. IN'L L. 732 (1949).
22. Id at 735.

REPORT

23. Ibid.
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cation of the Genocide Convention as submitted would therefore," Mr. Finch
summarizes, "confer upon the Federal Government a large area of jurisdiction
which it does not now possess under the Constitution." 24
The issues raised by the Bar spokesmen and Mr. Finch transcend the
Genocide Convention. The Genocide Convention is but the first of several
conventions being designed better to secure fundamental human rights and
security throughout the world community; and, if the nations of the world
ever decide to establish effective restraint upon preparation for atomic and
bacteriological warfare, imposition of the negative sanctions of criminal law
upon individuals and international enforcement will most certainly be indispensable components of such restraint. It may not therefore be amiss, what25
ever the pending action of the Senate on the Genocide Convention, to explore in brief detail the assumptions and arguments of the Bar spokesmen
and Mr. Finch and to ascertain whether the American people are in fact precluded by their Constitution from adhering to international agreements which
they may on policy grounds deem wise or even indispensable.
I
It is doubted by no responsible observer today that the treaty-making
power is sufficiently broad and expansible to cover effective action on all
matters of genuine international concern, under whatever changing conditions
a changing world may impose. 26 The framers of our Constitution thought
"it most safe," in Madison's words, to leave the treaty power without enumeration "to be exercised as contingencies may arise." 27 Madison emphasized:
"I do not think it possible to enumerate all the cases in which such external
regulations would be necessary. Would it be right to define all the cases in which
Congress could exercise this authority? The definition might and probably would be
defective. They might be restrained by such a definition from exercising the authority
where it could be essential to the interest and safety of the community." 2
The classic modern statement is that of Chief Justice Hughes:
"It seems to me that, whatever doubt there may originally have been or may yet
linger in some minds in regard to the scope of the treaty-making power, so far as it
relates to the external concerns of the nation there is no question for discussion. I
think it perfectly idle to consider that the Supreme Court would ever hold that any

24. Ibid.
25. As we write in mid-February, 1950, the Senate has taken no action and the
record of the hearings before the Sub-committee of Committee on Foreign Relations is
still unavailable.
26. For full documentation see McDougal and Leighton, The Rights of Man in the
World Community: Constitutional Illusions versus Rational Action, 14 LAW & CoNTEMP. PROB. 490, 515 (1949), 59 YALE L.J. 60, 90 (1949). [Citation hereafter will be
made only to the Yale Law Journal]. Similar views and further authorities appear in
Hyman, ConstitutionalAspects of the Covenant, 14 LAW & CONTEMP. PROD. 451 (1949).
27. 3 ELLIoTr's DEBATES 515 (2d ed. 1836).

28. Id. at 514-15.
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treaty made in a constitutional manner in relation to external concerns of the nation
is beyond the power of the sovereignty of the United States or invalid under the
Constitution of the United States where no express prohibition of the Constitution
has been violated." "'

This broad conception of the power has been many times accepted and expounded by the Supreme Court. A much honored pronouncement is that in
Geofroy v. Riggs in 1890:
"The treaty power, as expressed in the Constitution, is in terms unlimited except
by those restraints which are found in that instrument against the action of the

government or of its departments, and those arising from the nature of the government itself and of that of the States. It would not be contended that it extends so
far as to authorize what the Constitution forbids, or a change in the character of the
government or in that of one of the States, or a cession of any portion of the territory
of the latter without its consent. . . . But with these exceptions, it is not perceived
that there is any limit to the questions which can be adjusted touching any matter
which is properly the subject of negotiations with a foreign country." "
The case cormonly regarded as leading is Missouri v. Holland 31 in which
th Court sustained an act of Congress as "necessary and proper" to imple-

ment a treaty for the protection of birds migrating between the United States
and Canada, though two lower courts had held unconstitutional an earlier
act designed to secure the same end but not in aid of a treaty. 32 Mr. Justice
Holmes, speaking for the Court, insisted that "it is not lightly to be assumed
that, in matters requiring national action, 'a power which must belong to and
somewhere reside in every civilized government' is not to be found" and that
the "case before us must be considered in the light of our whole experience
and not merely in that of what was said a hundred years ago." 33
Whether a matter is of genuine international concern for determining the
scope of the treaty power may, accordingly, safely be assumed to be a question, not of derivation from some ageless absolute, but of contenporary
fact.3 4 It can scarcely be suggested in the light of the many recorded "humanitarian interventions" on behalf of minorities, 35 of the known relation between
the Nazis' internal and external violence, 36 of the ease with which under
modern conditions models of disrespect for human dignity anywhere can
29. Hughes, in 23 PROc. Am. Soc'Y INT'L L. 194 (1929)

(italics supplied).

30. 133 U.S. 258, 267, 10 Sup. Ct. 295, 33 L. Ed. 642 (1890).
31. 252 U.S. 416, 40 Sup. Ct. 382, 64 L. Ed. 641 (1920).
32. See United States v. McCullagh, 221 Fed. 288 (D. Kan. 1915) ; United States v.

Shauver, 214 Fed. 154 (E.D. Ark. 1914).
33. 252 U.S. at 433.
34. The theme is further developed in Boyd, The Expanding Treaty Power, 6 N.C.L.
REv. 428 (1928).
35. 1 HiDE, INTERNATIONAL LAW 249, 209, 211 (2d ed. 1945) ; 1 OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAW 280 (Lauterpacht ed. 1948); Hudson, The International Law of the
Future, 30 A.B.A.J. 560 (1944).
36. Judgment of the International Military Tribunal in 22 TRIAL OF THE MAJOR
WAR CRIMINALS 427 (Nuremberg 1948); Marx, Totalitarian Politics, 82 PRoc. Ala.

PHIL. Soc. 1 (1940) ; and Marx, Effects of Intcrnational Tension on Liberty Under Law,

48 COL. L. REV. 555 (1948).
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affect peoples' consciences everywhere,37 of the now generally recognized
world-wide interdependences of all peoples for human rights and security and
other values, 38 of the repeated obligations for the protection of human rights
undertaken in the United Nations Charter,3 9 of the unanimous resolution of
the General Assembly of the United Nations that genocide is a crime under
international law against all humanity, 40 of the unanimously adopted Universal Declaration of Human Rights,41 and of the several international conventions for the protection of human rights presently being drafted 42 that
the subject matter of the Genocide Convention is not properly within the
realm of such international concern. Even the Resolution, presently criticized, of the American Bar Association's House of Delegates begins with
the recitals "that it is the sense of the American Bar Association that the
conscience of America like that of the civilized world revolts against Genocide
(mass'killing and destruction of peoples)," "that such acts are contrary to
the moral law and are abhorrent to all who have a proper and decent regard
for the dignity of human beings, regardless of the national, ethnical, racial,
religious or political groups to which they belong," and "that Genocide ,as
thus understood should have the constant opposition of the government of
the United States and of all its people." 43 From such assumptions, it is
incredible contradiction to urge that the United States Government and its
people cannot constitutionally express their opposition through international
agreement.

The reiterated, though obscure, emphasis of the Bar spokesmen upon
"'revolutionary" or "tremendous" changes in our "form of government" bears
the inference that they assume that the constitutional powers reserved to our
several states in some way limit the powers of the Federal Government to
37. Under conditions of contemporary communication such personality dynamisnls
as are described in ALEXANDER, OUR AGE OF UNREASON (1932) ; LASSWELL, POWER AND
PERSONALITY (1948), and other comparable books are global in their scope. Note especially Alexander's chapter on The Emotional Structure of Totalitarianism.
38. See McDougal and Leighton, supra note 26, for the broad outlines of the con-

text in which the Genocide Convention is being proposed. Cf. McDougal, 7he Role of
Law in World Politics, 20 Miss. L.J. 253, 273 (1949).
39. The Charter contains no less than seven specific references to human rights.

McDougal and Leighton, supra note 26, at 67, offer itemization and summary. Article 55

pledges all subscribing states to promote "universal respect for, and observance of, human
rights and fundamental freedoms for all without distinctions as to race, sex, language,

or religion," and Article 56 to "joint and separate action in cooperation with the Or-

ganization for the achievement of the purposes set forth in Article 55." See, generally,

GOODRICH AND HAMBRO, CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS, COMMENTARY AND DocuMENTS (2d rev. ed. 1949); and Cohen, Human Rights Under the United Nations

Charter, 14

LAW & CONTEMP. PROD.

430 (1949).

40. See U.N. Doc. No. A/PV 179, at 70 (Dec. 9, 1948). There were no abstentions.
41. See U.N. Doc. No. A/PV 183, 161-65 (Dec. 10, 1948), A/PV 183/corr. 1
(Jan. 11, 1949). Byelorussia, Czechoslovakia, Poland, Saudi Arabia, Ukraine, South

Africa, Soviet Russia and Yugoslavia abstained.
42. See Symposium on International Human Rights, 14 LAW
411-650 (1949).

43. See A.B.A.

TIONS,

REPORT

AND CONTEmn'.

PROD.

SPECIAL COMMITTEE ON PEACE AND LAW THRouGn UNITED NA-

3 (1049).
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make treaties or other international agreements. The consistent decisions of
the Supreme Court, the practice of all branches of the government, and the
opinions of leading authorities since the beginning of the country make it
clear, however, that the powers of the states in no way limit the powers of
the Federal Government to make international agreements. Among the prime
factors leading to the call of the Constitutional Convention were the intolerable difficulties of conducting foreign affairs under the Articles of Confederation 44 and the framers sought in Article VI (2) of the new Constitution to make this nation "one" as to all external concerns by providing that
"This Constitution, and the laws of the United States which shall be made in
pursuance thereof, and all treaties made, or which shall be made, under the authority
of the United States, shall be the supreme law of the land; and the judges in every
State shall be bound thereby, anything in the Constitution or laws of any State to the
contrary notwithstanding."

In the celebrated case of Ware v. Hylton, 45 the Supreme Court applied this
clause to hold the Treaty of Peace with Great Britain in 1783, preserving
debts owed by American citizens to British creditors, paramount to a
Virginia statute purporting to discharge such debts. Mr. Justice Chase,
for the Court said: "It is the declared will of the people of the United States
that every treaty made by the authority of the United States shall be superior
to the constitutiom and laws of any individual state; and their will alone is to
decide." 46 In the application of this principle the Supreme -Court has upheld
national supremacy with reference to such other matters ordinarily left to
state regulation as "title to land, escheat and inheritance, statutes of limitation,
local taxation, administration of alien estates, prohibition of employment of
foreign labor, and the limitation of pawn-brokerage to citizens." 47 In statesmanlike summary Professor Borchard long ago observed:
"It is within the power of the federal government by treaty to remove from
state control any matter which may become the subject of negotiation with a foreign
government. With the continued drawing together of the world by increased facilities
for travel and communication, the subjects of common interest which require international regulation will continue to grow in extent and variety. Uniformity of legislation by withdrawal from state legislative control of such subjects as marriage and
divorce, labor legislation, the ownership and inheritance of property, and all matters
affecting aliens would be possible by the exertion of the necessary federal treaty
power."

Even if it be assumed, as the Bar spokesmen wrongly assume that the Geno44. See FARRAND, THE FRAMING OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 42-52

(1923).
45.
46.
47.
48.

3 Dall. 199, 1 L. Ed. 568 (U.S. 1796).
3 Dall. at 237.
See McDougal and Leighton, supra note 26. at 95, 96, and cases cited.
Note, Treaty-Making Power as Support for Federal Legislation, 29 YALE L.J.

445, 449 (1920).
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cide Convention embodies only "domestic crimes" under present state control, from a federal power so broadly conceived and so expansible it is hardly
possible, certainly not rational, to except genocide.
The Tenth Amendment, it may be added for full measure of doctrine, in
no way detracts from federal power to make international agreements. The
irrelevance of this Amendment is implicit in all of the decisions indicated
above and in Missouri v. Holland,49 Mr. Justice Holmes explicitly rejects
the notion that some "invisible radiation from the general terms of the Tenth
Amendment" 50 limits the treaty power.
"We must consider," he writes, "what this country has become in deciding what
that Amendement has reserved. . . . No doubt the great body of private relations
usually fall within the control of the State, but a treaty may override its power....
Here a national interest of very nearly the first magnitude is involved. It can be
protected only by national action in concert with that of another power." "
Fortunately the Amendment has since been recognized by the Supreme Court
as equally a superfluous truism with respect to the powers of the whole Con52
gress and the President.
The suggestion of the Bar spokesmen that approval of the Genocide Convention by the Senate as a treaty would be incompatible with the power of
the whole Congress "to define and punish . . . offenses against the law of
nations" is similarly without foundation. Historic answer was formulated in
the Versailles Treaty debate by Senator Kellogg:
"The argument is as old as the history of treaties in this country. It was presented with great ability by the opponents of the Jay treaty and overcome by the
able statesmen of that day, foremost among whom was Alexander Hamilton. Fron
that day to the present time the question has been frequently raised in connection with
treaties for the payment of money, regulating commerce, fixing import duties, regulating
rights of trade with foreign countries, fixing boundaries, and various other subjects, the
objection being that as the power to legislate in relation to these matters was in the
entire Congress, any treaty made by the President and the Senate was therefore void.
But these objections have proved unavailing and a large number of treaties have been

49. 252 U.S. 416, 40 Sup. Ct. 382, 64 L. Ed. 641 (1920).
50. 252 U.S. at 434.
51. Ibid.
52. United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 124, 61 Sup. Ct. 451, 85 L. Ed. 609
1940); Pink v. United States, 315 U.S. 203, 62 Sup. Ct. 552, 86 L. Ed. 796 (1942).
In the former case Mr. Justice Stone, speaking for the Court, said: "The amendment
states but a truism that all is retained which has not been surrendered. There is nothing
in the history of its adoption to suggest that it was more than declaratory of the relationship between the national and state governments as it has been established by the constitution before the amendment or that its purpose was other than to allay fears that
the new national government might seek to exercise powers not granted, and that the
states might not be able to exercise fully their reserved powers .... From the beginning
and for many years the amendment has been construed as not depriving the national government of authority to resort to all means for the exercise of a granted power which
are appropriate and plainly adapted to the permitted end." 312 U.S. at 124. See also
Feller, The Tenth Amendment Retires, 27 A.B.A.J. 223 (1941).
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made and ratified by the Senate where legislation was necessary to carry them into
operation."

Throughout our history the treaty power and the powers of the whole Congress have in fact been exercised concurrently, 54 the latest expression prevailing,55 over the same events of the, greatest variety in our international

affairs: witness treaties and statutes on the regulation of commerce, trademarks and copyrights, armaments, taxation, traffic in women, trade in danger56
ous drugs, commercial aviation, and so on. No good reason has been, or
can be, given to justify treating this one particular power of the Congress,
the power "to define and punish ... offenses against the law of nations," as
exclusive with respect to this one particular treaty, the Genocide Convention. 5 7 The real relevance of this particular power of the Congress is not to
establish the disability of the President and the Senate, but rather to affirm

53. See 5 HACKWoRTH, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 12 (1943).

54. See Burr, Treaty-Making Power, 51 PRoc. Am.

5 MooRE,

PHIL.

Soc'y 271, 306 (1912);

DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 164 (1906); WFINFELD, LABOR TREATIES AND

5 (1937).
55. See Foster v. Neilson, 2 Pet. 253, 7 L. Ed. 415 (U.S. 1829) for the proposition
that treaties may supersede prior Congressional acts, and The Cherokee Tobacco, 11
Wall.616, 20 L. Ed. 227 (U.S. 1870) for the converse proposition that, from the point of
view of domestic law, an act of Congress may override an earlier treaty.
56. McDougal and Leighton, supra note 26, at 98.
57. Penal sanctions have been invoked time and again "pursuant to international
agreement." Even a partial history of such legislation establishes the existence of a
traditional pattern.
An international convention for the protection of submarine cables [See 24 STAT.
LABOR CONTRAcTS

989 (1884)] was followed by criminal legislation for its enforcement. See 47 U.S.C.A.
§ 21 (1928), first enacted in 1888.
International accord for the suppression of the white slave traffic [see 35 STAT.
1979 (1904)] resulted in speedy federal criminal legislation. See 18 U.S.C. § 242 (1948);
cf. 18 U.S.C.A. § 402 (1927), first enacted in 1910.
Early international agreement in the field of opium control [38 STAT. 1912 (1912)]
brought federal regulatory change accompanied by criminal sanctions. See 21 U.S.C.A.
§ 182 (1927) ; section added in 1914.
Penal legislation as recent as 1942 was enacted "pursuant to international agreement" in the field of opium control. See 21 U.S.C.A. § 188 (Supp. 1949). Infinitely
broader in its application to domestic events than the Genocide Convention, it provided
for rigid federal controls over individuals and business enterprises engaged in opium
manufacture, by means of a licensing system. This was partially based on the treaty
power. In the case of Stutz v. Bureau of Narcotics, 56 F. Supp. 810 (N.D. Cal. 1944),
this use of the treaty power was endorsed by the federal court. In the words of the
court: "Thecompetency of the United States to enter into treaty stipulations with foreign
powers designed to establish, through appropriate legislation, an internationally effective
system of control over the production and distribution of habit forming drugs is not
questioned. The obligations of the United States . . . were lawfully undertaken in the
proper exercise of its treaty making power. And Congress is constitutionally empowered
to enact whatever legislation is necessary and proper for carrying into execution the
treaty making power of the United States." Id. at 813.
Sanctions have further been invoked for international offenses without benefit of
formal international agreement. Thus, for example, the United States has penalized the
counterfeiting of foreign currency [see 18 U.S.C. § 482 (1948) ; cf. 23 STAT. 22 (1884)]
solely for the reason that the "law of nations requires every government to use 'due
diligence' to prevent a wrong being done within its own dominion to another nation with
which it is at peace, or to the people thereof." United States v. Arjona, 120 U.S. 479,
484, 7 Sup. Ct. 628, 30 L. Ed. 728 (1887).
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beyond reasonable doubt that there is a perfectly constitutional alternative to
8
the treaty-making procedure for approving the Genocide Convention.
The *fact is, moreover-wholly contrary to the suggestions of the Bar
spokesmen-that this particular Convention, as submitted by the President to
the Senate, expressly reserves to the whole Congress the power to define,
and to fix the punishment for, the offense created. By its very terms the Convention is made non-self-executing. In Article V the contracting parties
merely "undertake to enact, in accordance with their respective Constitutions,
the necessary legislation to give effect to the provisions of the present Convention and, in particular, to provide effective penalties for persons guilty of
genocide or of any of the other acts." Article VI requires, further, the legislative designation of competent tribunals. As long ago as Foster v. Neilson, 0
Chief Justice Marshall, in considering whether the treaty by which Florida
was acquired from Spain was self-executing, announced a doctrine, not
since disputed, that "when the terms of the stipulation import a contract,
when either of the parties engages to perform a particular act, the treaty
addresses itself to the political, not the judicial department; and the legislature must execute the contract before it can become a rule for the court." 60
The words of the Genocide Convention, and its "legislative history," would
seem to bring it clearly within this principle. 61 Whatever possible doubt
anyone might entertain could be removed by the Senate attaching a reservation that this government interprets the Convention to be non-self-executing.
58. The equivalence with the treaty power of the powers of the whole Congress and

the President is developed in McDougal and Lans, Treaties and Conqressional-Executive or Presidential Agreements: Interchangeable Instruments of National Policy, 54
YALE L.J. 181, 534 (1945); CORwiN, THE CONSTITUTION AND WORLD ORGANIZATION 8

(1944); MCCLuRE, INTERNATIONAL EXECUTIVE AGREEMENTS (1941); Wright, The
Utited States and International Agreements, 38 Am. J. INT'L L. 341 (1944).
The power to "define and punish piracies and felonies committed on the high seas
and offenses against the law of nations" (U.S. CONST. Art. I, § 8) lends itself to the
accommodation of an expanding concept of international criminality under a conteinporary law of nations with remarkable ease. A power that has been sufficiently flexible
to cover as diverse a group of offenders as pirates [United States v. Smith, 5 Wheat.
153, 5 L. Ed. 57 (U.S. 1820)], assailants of diplomats [Respublica v. Longchamps, I
Dall. 111, 1 L. Ed. 59 (Pa. 1784)] counterfeiters [United States v. Arjona, 120 U.S.
479, 7 Sup. Ct. 628, 30 L. Ed. 728 (1887)] and war criminals [Ex parte Quirn, 317
U.S. 1, 63 Sup. Ct. 1, 87 L. Ed. 3 (1942)], would seem capable of extension to perpetrators of genocide. For further support of congressional authority there is, as the
articles above indicate, a whole array of other relevant powers specifically granted to
the Congress.
In 1818, the United States Government assumed the right to punish an international
offense on foreign soil on no other theory than that a duty of action devolved on the outside
world in the face of the helplessness of domestic authority against the offenders. In an
official communication to the French Minister in Washington, Secretary of State Adams
explained the American position as follows: "When an island is occupied by a nest of
pirates, harassing the commerce of the United States, they may be pursued and driven
from it by authority of the United States, even though such island were nominally under
the jurisdiction of Spain, Spain not exercising over it any control." 2 MOORE, DIGEST
OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 408 (1906).
59. 2 Pet. 253, 7 L. Ed. 415 (U.S. 1829).
60. 2 Pet. at 314.
61. Rusk, The Place of the Genocide Convention in the General Pattern of U.S.
Foreign Relations, 22 STATE DEP'T BULL. 163, 164 (1950).
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From these explicit provisions in the Genocide Convention requiring
legislation by the contracting parties "in accordance with their respective
constitutions" 62 to make the Convention internally effective-provisions
which can be made even more explicit if the Senate so desires-it is further
apparent that the contention of the Bar spokesmen that the United States
would be peculiarly vulnerable in adhering to the Convention, on the theory
that the Convention might become enforceable within this country before
being implemented in other countries, is completely unreal. The suggestion
of the Bar spokesmen that the plain terms of a treaty cannot preclude its
"automatic operation" under the supremacy clause, that no way can be devised to prevent the inexorable operation of this clause, is sheer fantasy,
belied by a long and continuous record of governmental practice and judicial
decision.63 Nothing in the Constitution requires a treaty or other international
agreement to be self-executing. The supremacy clause does nothing more
than make the terms of an international agreement, whatever the terms are,
the law of the land: it prescribes no particular terms. This government can
stipulate with other governments for an agreement to become effective, internally as well as externally, at whatever time and subject to whatever conditions it chooses. It is difficult, furthermore, to see what this country could
lose in prohibiting such an infamous crime as genocide even if other countries failed to honor their commitments. We have had no genocide in this
country as the proposed Convention defines it and our democratic values
preclude our planning any new genocide. In case of bad faith by other governments, the Congress may of course always promptly abrogate any internal obligation we may have effected; and well-hallowed doctrines of
international law, such as rebus sic stantibus 64 and abrogation for failure of
performance, are available to discharge any international obligation assumed.
II
It is clear that the Genocide Convention, as submitted to the Senate, in
no way commits the United States to future acceptance of an international
criminal court. Trial is to be by "such international penal tribunal as may
have jurisdiction" only "with respect to those Contracting Parties which
shall have accepted its jurisdiction." 65 Since, however, the Convention does
62. Art. V.
63. For conclusive development of the point see Chafee, Legal Problems of Freedom
of Information in the United Nations, 14 LAw & CONTEmP. PROB. 545, 560 (1949). See
also Dickinson, Are the Liquor Treaties Self-Executing? 20 Am. J. INT'L L. 444 (1926).

Without benefit of any saving provisions, treaties providing for money payments and
treaties which are penal in character have been regarded as non-self-executing by the
courts. See, e.g., Turner v. American Baptist Missionary Society, 24 Fed. Cas. 344, No.
14,251 (C.C. Mich. 1852); and The Over The Top, 5 F.2d'838 (D. Conn. 1925).
64. BRIGGS, THE LAW OF NATIONS: CASES, DOCUMENTS, AND NOTES 477 (1938);
HARVARD RESEARCH IN INTERNATioN.AL LAW, LAW OF TREATIES 1077, 1096 (1935).

65. Art. VI.
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contemplate the creation of an international tribunal and since, as observed
above, a world criminal court may become a necessity not only for punishing
genocide but for policing other crimes, such as violation of atomic energy
regulations, inimical to world security, 66 it may be worthwhile to look more
closely at the spectre of foreign inquisition raised by the Bar spokesmen and
to examine whether a world criminal court is in fact incompatible with our
Constitution and alien to our traditions.
One hundred and fifty-five years ago, when the Jay Treaty was before
the country, a spokesman of that day declaimed:
"If they can create new crimes by treaty, and define the punishment of them, the
whole criminal code is subjected to the will of the president and senate. . . . And
to begin with the sixth article. By this article commissioners are to be appointed,
two by the British king, two by the president and senate; the fifth by the other four,
or by lot. These commission6rs are to sit as a court, to determine questions relative
to the demands of the British . . . They are to examine the parties on oath, to fix
their ount rules of evidence, and to decide not by the laws of the country, but according
to their ideas of justice and equity. Their decision is to be both arbitrary and final.
... What power then exists either in the president and senate, or even in the legislature
to assume this right, which the Union has vested in a judiciary . . . Or will it be said,
that the power of making treaties, implies a right to trample under foot every cheek
that the constitution has provided against the abuses of either branch of government ?" "7

Today the Bar spokesmen say:
"When it is borne in mind that the rights as embodied in the first ten amendments are
a restraint on our federal government-rights which every citizen inherently has
against the United States and which it does not possess and cannot give awayhow can that government by treaty, or otherwise, delegate the punishment of a crime,
which can become such only by act of Congress, to an international tribunal?" 0
Decisively rejected when first made, the argument has today even less basis
in our Constitution and even less relevance to the national interest.

It cannot today reasonably be doubted that the United States has the
power to join in the establishment of international courts with jurisdiction
69
The
over events that are the proper subjects of international negotiation.
power has been too many times exercised, with the support of all branches
of the government, and never denied. Witness the participation by the United
States in a whole host of international arbitration tribunals 70 and in the
66. One of the best general statements of the need for a world court with real power
(1944).

is KELSEN, PEACE THROUGH LAW

67. "Cato," No. XIII, in I AMERICAN REMEM1BRANCER 248-52 (1795).
68. A.B.A. SPECIAL COMMITTEE ON PEACE AND LAW THROUGH UNITED NATIONS,
REPORT 12 (1949).
69. 2 HYDE, INTERNATIONAL LAW § 504 (2d ed. 1945).
70. See HUDSON, INTERTATWNAL TRIBUNALS (1944); MOORE, HISTORY AND DIGEST
OF THE INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATIONS TO WHICH THE UNITED STATES HAS BEEN A
PARTY (1898); CARLSTON, THE PROCESS OF INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION (1946);

Hackworth, Fundamental Principles Governing International Claims, 17 A.B.A.J. 193
(1931).
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recent international war crimes courts,71 all supported by the Congress and
sustained by the Supreme Court, 72 and our contemporary adherence to the
International Court of Justice. 7 Article III (1) of the Constitution, providing that "the judicial power of the United States shall be vested in one
Supreme Court, and in such inferior courts as the Congress may from time
to time ordain and establish," has never been held to exclude the establishment, under a wide variety of federal powers, of other courts, both national
and international, not subject to direct review by the regular courts established under that Article. 74 The Supreme Court has, furthermore, repeatedly
held that these other courts are not bound to compliance ipsis verbis with
constitutional limitations imposed by the Bill of Rights upon criminal proceedings in the regular federal courts: it is enough, it opens no floodgates to
arbitrary power, if these courts, like the regular state courts exercising concurrent jurisdiction with the federal courts, comply, not with the letter of
the various amendments, but with the substance of "due process." 75 A similar
conclusion could easily obtain with respect to an international court established
with jurisdiction over genocide or other international crimes committed within
this country. It is not constitutionally necessary for the United States to force
the rest of the world, in order to secure an effective international criminal
jurisdiction, to adopt an exact replica of eighteenth-century American institutions designed to limit the power of regular federal courts. The Supreme
Court could, without strain of precedent or reason, hold constitutional our
participation in an international court whose charter and procedures incorporated the substantial elements of fairness which those institutions were
designed to secure.76 For any abuse by international officials of such charter
71. See Hirota v. MacArthur, 338 U.S. 197, 69 Sup. Ct. 197 (1948), Note, 47 MicH.
L. REv. 835 (1949) ; Flick v. Johnson, 174 F.2d 983 (D.C. Cir. 1949), cert. denied, 338
U.S. 879 (1949); Fairman, Some New Problems of the Constitution Following the
Flag, 1 STAN. L. REv. 587 (1949).

72. See Comegys v. Vasse, 1 Pet. 193, 7 L. Ed. 108 (U.S. 1828); Frelinghuysen

v. Key, 110 U.S. 63, 3 Sup. Ct. 462, 28 L. Ed. 71 (1884) ; and cases cited supra, note 71.
73. See U.N. CHARTER, c. 14; GOODRI cH AND HvAtBO, CHARTER OF THE UNITED
NAT ONs 606 (2d rev. ed. 1949); Hudson, The World Court: America's Declaration
Accepting Jurisdiction,32 A.B.A.J. 832 (1946).
74. Illustrations are offered in the text below. See MooRE, JUDICIAL CODE-COMMENTARY if 0.03(2) (1949) ; In re Ross, 140 U.S. 453, 11 Sup. Ct. 846, 35 L. Ed. 581
(1891) ; It re Yamashita, 327 U.S. 1, 66 Sup. Ct. 340, 90 L. Ed. 499 (1946); Hirota v.
MacArthur, 338 U.S. 197, 69 Sup. Ct. 197 (1948); cf. American Ins. Co. v. Canter,

1 Pet. 511, 7 L. Ed. 242 (U.S. 1828). On the nonexclusiveness of Article III for other

purposes see National Mut. Ins. Co. v. Tidewater Transfer Co., 337 U.S. 582, 69 Sup.
Ct. 1173 (1949), Note, 3 VAND. L. REV. 271 (1950).

75. Full documentation follows in the text. See Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 40, 63
tion we must conclude that § 2 of Article III and the Fifth and Sixth Amendments
Sup. Ct. 1, 87 L. Ed. 3 (1942) : "In the light of long continued and consistent interpreta-

cannot be taken to have extended the right to demand a jury to trials by military commissions." Cf. In re Ross, 140 U.S. 453, 11 Sup. Ct. 846, 35 L. Ed. 581 (1891) ; it re

Vidal, 179 U.S. 126, 21 Sup. Ct. 48, 45 L. Ed. 118 (1900).

76. For similar brief presentation see Hyman, Constitutional Aspects of the Covenant, 14 LAW & CONTEMP. PRoB. 451, 462 (1949). An early authoritative exposition is
Wright, Treaties and the Constitutional Separation of Powers in the United States, 12

Am. J. INT'L L. 64, 70, 85 (1918).
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and procedures, if spectres should become real dangers, the United States
could always effect, by express reservation if regarded as necessary, a speedy
withdrawal from the court.
The extent to which the United States has participated in international
arbitration, free from direct review by national courts, needs no new recounting. It is common knowledge how the Jay Treaty of 1794 77 between the
United States and Great Britain "gave impetus to a revival of the judicial
process of arbitration which had fallen into disuse during the eighteenth
century." 78 This treaty established an international commission with the
power of administering oaths, hearing witnesses, and making binding awards
upon the complaints of "divers merchants." 79 The attack upon the treaty was,
as indicated above, almost indistinguishable in tenor and' words from the
attack by contemporary Bar spokesmen upon the Genocide Convention. With
little difficulty, however, this attack was swept aside, and arbitration treaties
granting international tribunals authority to adjudicate over transactions
within the jurisdiction of the United States, 80 and commonly affecting private
claims,8 ' became our accepted governmental practice. Today a preference for
77. See 2 TREATIES AND OTHER INTERNATIONAL ACTS
(Miller, 1931).
78. HUDSON, INTERNATIONAL TRIBUNALS 3 (1944).
79. See note 77, supra, 249-51.
80. As the Jay Treaty, supra note 78, clearly did. See 2

OF THE UNITED STATES

HYDE, INTERNATIONAL

245

LAW,

1586 et seq. (2d ed. 1945) ; HUDSON, INTERNATIONAL TRIBUNALS 196 (1944). The question of national liability, arising out of the injury of aliens on United States soil provides
another outstanding example. See BORCHARD, THE DIPLOmATIC PROTECTION OF CITIZENS
ABROAD 214, 215 (1919).
It may be observed that an irrational emphasis is sometimes placed upon the physical
locas of an event and upon outmoded notions about a "territorial" basis of Jurisdiction.
For full discussion see COOK, THE LOGICAL AND LEGAL BASES OF TIIE CONFLICT OF
LAWS (1942). The important fact for a nation, as well as for its individual citizens, is
not simply where an event takes place but rather 'the total effect of the event upon all
the values of the nation and its citizens. Thus, in recognition of this importance of total
effect, nation-states have claimed jurisdiction upon a great variety of bases. These are
summarized in the Harvard Research under "five general principles": "first, the territorial principle, determining jurisdiction by reference to the place where the offense is
committed; second, the nationality principle, determining jurisdiction by reference to
the nationality or national character of the person committing the offense; third, the protective principle, determining jurisdiction by reference to the national interest injured
by the offense; fourth, the universality principle, determining jurisdiction by reference
to the custody of the person committing the offense; and, fifth, the passive personality
principle, determining jurisdiction by reference to the nationality or national character
of the person injured by the offense." HARVARD RESEARCH IN INTERNATIONAL LAW,
JURISDICTION WITH RESPECT TO CRIMtE (1935). The United States has undertaken to
exercise jurisdiction over acts taking place beyond its boundaries but having effects
within its boundaries. Ford v. United States, 273 U.S. 593, 47 Sup. Ct. 531, 71 L. Ed. 793
(1926). Holding an agreement made in Canada to violate our Antitrust Act, Judge
Learned Hand in United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir.
1945) states: "[A]ny state may impose liabilities, even upon persons not within its
allegiance, for conduct outside its borders that has consequences within its borders
which the state reprehends." Id. at 443. It should be obvious that unless nation-states
are willing to yield to any international court they create concessions on "territorial"
notions of jurisdiction comparable to those they independently claim for themselves, no
very effective controls can be established over crimes against world security.
81. See Frelinghuysen v. Key, 110 U.S. 63, 3 Sup. Ct. 462, 28 L. Ed. 71 (1884). A
convention had been concluded between Mexico and the United States for the adjustment
of the property claims of citizens of either country against the other under the auspices
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international arbitration is national policy,8 2 even though the traditional procedure of arbitration tribunals is at variance from that constitutionally re83
quired of our regular courts.
The power of the United States to participate in the establishment of
international courts, free from direct review by national courts and not restrained by the literal prescriptions of the Bill of Rights, has received recent
and dramatic confirmation in the decisions of the Supreme Court declining
to review the judgments of the World War II international war crimes
tribunals. 84 Thus in Hirota v. General of the Army MacArthur, 85 though the
petitioners, Japanese military commanders and officials who had been found
guilty of war crimes against humanity by the International Military Tribunal
for the Far East, sought leave to file petitions for writs of habeas corpus
to test the legality of their detention, the Supreme Court found that "the
tribunal sentencing these petitioners is not a tribunal of the United States"
but a military tribunal "set up by General MacArthur as the agent of the
Allied Powers" and, hence, that "the courts of the United States have no
power or authority to review, to affirm, set aside or annul the judgments and
sentences imposed on these petitioners." 86 In a special concurrence, Mr.
Justice Douglas questioned whether the Supreme Court should stop short with
the finding that the tribunal had been set up by the Allied Powers and insisted
that "we would ascertain whether, so far as Ameican participation is concerned there was authority to try the defendants for the precise crimes with
which they are charged," 87 but he assumed that the Court had "no authority
to review the judgment of an international tribunal" and concluded that the
Tokyo Tribunal in question was not a "judicial tribunal" but "solely an instrument of political power," with respect to which "the President as Commanderof an international arbitration commission whose decision was to be considered final. An

award was made in due course on the claim of a Benjamin Weil, an American citizen,
and the Mexican government began paying installments to the United States Government
for distribution to the claimant. Upon representations by the Mexican government that
the award had been fraudulently procured, the United States Government, notwithstanding continued Mexican payments under the award, suspended distribution to the claimant
and entered into negotiations with the Mexican government for a rehearing of the case.
Suit to obtain mandamus requiring continued distribution under the award was brought
on the theory that the award had vested an absolute property right which neither the
United States singly, nor the United States and Mexico jointly could divest. The suit
was dismissed. "As to the right of the United States to treat with Mexico for a retrial,"
said the Supreme Court, "we entertain no doubt." 110 U.S. at 72. See also United States
cx rel. Boynton v. Blaine, 139 U.S. 306, 11 Sup. Ct. 607, 35 L. Ed. 183 (1891) ; La Abra
Silver Mining Co. v. United States, 175 U.S. 423, 20 Sup. Ct. 168, 44 L. Ed. 223 (1899)
The La Ninfa, 75 Fed. 513 (9th Cir. 1896).
82. See 22 U.S.C.A. § 261 (1927) : "It is hereby declared to be the policy of the
United States to adjust and settle its international disputes through arbitration."
83. See BISHOP, INTERNATIONAL ARBITRAL PROCEDURE (1930); CARLSTON, Op. Cit.
srupra note 70; RALSTON, THE LAW AND PROCEDURE OF INTERNATIONAL TRIBUNALS
(1926) (Supp. 1936).
84. See supra, note 71. The cases are collected by Mr. Justice Jackson in Hirota v.
MacArthur, 338 U.S. 197, 69 Sup. Ct. 197 (1948).
85. 338 U.S. 197, 69 Sup. Ct. 197 (1948).
86. 338 U.S. at 198.
87. Id. at 205.
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in-Chief, and as spokesman for the nation in foreign affairs, had the final
say." 88 The relevance of this precedent may be emphasized by recalling that
the Fifth and Sixth Amendments, when applicable, are generally held to protect aliens and citizens alike.8 9
Early precedent in the penal sphere for according international adjudication, in the sense of universal jurisdiction, over events, touching American
citizens and otherwise within the jurisdiction of the United States, may be
found with respect to the crime of piracy, long regarded as an offense against
all nations. "Piracy is by the law of nations," states the Harvard Research,
"a special, common basis of jurisdiction beyond the familiar, grounds of personal allegiance, territorial dominion, dominion over ships, and injuries to
interests under the states' protection." 90 Because "pirates are enemies of the
human race . . . every state participates in a common jurisdiction to capture

pirates and their ships on the high sea, and to prosecute and punish for piracy
persons who lawfully are seized and against whom there is proper ground
for prosecution." 91 To these traditional conceptions of international law the
Congress has given specific legislative implementation. 92 It should require no
greater stretch in human sympathy or of the Constitution to extend authoritative doctrines and policies created for controlling robbers on the high seas,
as "enemies of the human race," to the apprehension and punishment of massmurderers on land.
Further historic precedent, less well remembered today, can be found in
measures undertaken by the United States in collaboration with other governments to suppress the slave trade, a crime analogous to genocide. Here a
tempestuous course of Anglo-American diplomacy was climaxed by our ultimate acceptance of the principle of international penal jurisdiction over
individuals for acts committed within unquestioned United States jurisdiction.
Following after the establishment of international tribunals for the suppres-

88. Id. at 204, 215.

89. The withdrawal of such procedural safeguards as grand jury indictment and

jury trial from aliens facing-e.g., deportation proceedings-has been justified solely
by the assumption that since no criminal punishment is involved, the Fifth and
Sixth Amendments are inapplicable. See Wong Wing v. United States, 163 U.S. 228,
16 Sup. Ct. 977, 41 L. Ed. 140 (1896) ; cf. Bridges v. Wixon, 326 U.S. 135, 65 Sup. Ct.
1443, 89 L. Ed. 2103 (1945). That aliens are among the direct beneficiaries of the Bill
of Rights has been repeatedly proclaimed by the Supreme Court. "To be sure," said Mr.
Justice Douglas, speaking for the Court, "aliens as well as citizens are entitled to the
protection of the Fifth Amendment." United States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203, 228, 62 Sup.
Ct. 552, 86 L. Ed. 796 (1942). Similarly, aliens as well as citizens have been held entitled to freedom of speech and press. Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252, 62 Sup. Ct.
190, 86 L. Ed. 192, 159 A.L.R. 1346 (1941); Bridges v. Wixon, 326 U.S. 135, 148, 65
Sup. Ct. 1443, 89 L. Ed. 2103 (1945). In the field of state legislation, aliens as well as
citizens are deemed to be within the protection of the Fourteenth Amendment. Takahashi
v. Fish and Game Commission, 334 U.S. 410, 68 Sup. Ct. 1138, 92 L. Ed. 1478 (1948).
90. HARVARD RESEARCH IN INTERNATIONAL LAw, PIRACY 757 (1932).
91. Ibid.; cf. The Marianna Flora, 11 Wheat. 1, 40, 6 L. Ed. 405 (U.S. 1826);
United States v. Palmer, 3 Wheat. 610, 630, 631, 4 L. Ed. 471 (U.S. 1818).
92. See 18 U.S.C.A. § 1651 (1948) for the most recent legislative implementation.
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sion of the slave trade by England and other countries, 93 an Anglo-American
treaty, signed on March 13, 1824, 94 declared the slave trade to be piracy- at
least between the two contracting parties who were accorded the reciprocal
right of search on the high seas coupled with the duty of escorting guilty
vessels and crews for surrender to the jurisdiction of the tribunals of the
country to which they belonged. The action was punitive, indistinguishable
from search and arrest under municipal polide auspices. Approved in the
Senate in the same year, 95 this treaty had gathered decisive support in the
House well in advance of its ratification. As early as 1823, the House by
resolution, had urged the President to enter into negotiations with other
states with a view to declaring the slave trade piracy by the law of nations 96
and therefore punishable on the basis of universal jurisdiction. Eloquent
testimony to the overwhelming support for this measure of international
punishment was given by no less formidable an opponent than John Quincy
Adams: "But as to the right of search, in the bitterness of my soul I say it
was conceded by all the authorities of this nation." 17
The continuity of national policy on slave trading was emphasized in
1890 when the reciprocal right of search was conceded by this country in conjunction with all of the major powers by the Act of Brussels. 98 Long before,
however, United States recognition of the principle of international criminality
and of the jurisdiction of international penal tribunals over individual citizens
93. International tribunals were established by treaty shortly after an Eight Power

Declaration at the Congress'of Vienna in February, 1815, had called for the abolition
of the slave trade as "repugnant to the principles of humanity and universal morality."

3 STATE PAPERs 971. Their function was to determine, without appeal, the legality of
detention of vessels brought into their jurisdiction by war ships of the parties. Condemnation followed a positive finding. See British treaties with Spain, 4 STATE PAPERS 3353 (1817); Brazil, 14 STATE PAPERS 609 (1826); Netherlands, 5 STATE PAPERS 125
(1818) ; Sweden, 12 STATE PAPERS 3 (1824). The treaty with Sweden is particularly significant in establishing the punitive nature of the operation. As explained in the treaty, the
two contracting parties "mutually consent that the Ships of their Royal Navies . . . shall
visit such merchant-vessels of the two Nations as may be suspected .

.

. of being con-

cerned in the Traffick of Slaves, contrary to the provisions of this Treaty, and, in case
thereof, may detain and bring away such Vessels, in order that they may be brought
to trial." 12 STATE PAPERS 6. The Mixed International Courts of Justice, with the duty
of receiving the depositions of the crews, decided upon the legality of detention and had
powers of condemnation. By this treaty, a captain facing such an international tribunal
was granted the right of retaining counsel "to conduct his defense." Id. at 20 '(italics
supplied). See also Quintuple Treaty, 30 STATE PAPERS 269 (1841). See generally
JACKSON, EUROPEAN POWERS AND SOUTH-EAST AFRICA (1942); MATHIESON, GREAT
BRITAIN AND THE SLAVE TRADE (1929); SOULSBY, THE RIGHT OF SEARCH AND THE
SLAVE TRADE IN ANGLO-AMAERIcAN RELATIONS
94. 12 STATE PAPERS 838 (1824).

(1933).

95. Because of geographical restrictions placed upon the right of search by the
Senate, the treaty was subsequently rejected by Great Britain. See id. at 853-58.
96. Text of House resolution, carried by a vote of 131 to 9 on Feb. 28, 1823, 40
ANNALS OF CONG. 1147 (1823): "Resolved, That the President of the United States be
requested to enter upon and prosecute, from time to time, such Negotiations with the
several maritime powers of Europe and America, as he may deem expedient for the
effectual abolition of the African slave trade, and its ultimate denunciation, as Piracy,
under the law of nations, by the consent of the civilized world."
97. CONG. GLOBE, 27th Cong., 2d Sess. 424 (1842).
98. U.S. TREATY SER. No. 383 (Dep't State 1890).
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for acts committed within United States jurisdiction had become final. By the
treaty of 1862 between this country and Great Britain. 99 the reciprocal right of
arrest, detention and search was authoritatively reiterated. This was supplemented by delegation of partial punishment of the offense to three "Mixed
Courts of Justice, formed of an equal number of individuals of the two nations," using a procedure at variance from that of the federal or state courts,
and authorized to pronounce judgment without appeal. 10 0 The scope of the
punishment by order of the Mixed Courts of Justice was restricted to a prop1 1
erty forfeiture: the condemnation and breaking up of the guilty vessel.
Additional pains and penalties could be inflicted by domestic tribunals. Further
internationalization of the criminal process was effected by the treaty's imposing the requirement that "in so far as it may not be attended with grievous
expense and inconvenience, the master and crew of any vessel which may be
condemned by a sentence of one of the Mixed Courts of Justice ...

[should]

be sent and delivered up to the jurisdiction of the nation under whose flag the
condemned vessel was sailing . . . and that the witnesses and proofs necessary to establish .

.

. guilt .

.

. [should] also be sent with them."

102

To the

Mixed Court infliction of punishment by severe property forfeitures, we see
thus added internationalization of the criminal process in arrest, search, detention and the collection of incriminating evidence for further penal action
elsewhere. Theright of detention alone carries with it an exhaustive criminal
jurisdiction over the person. Infractions, whether they be misdemeanors or
felonies, when committed in the course of a detention authorized by treaty,
may give rise to individual criminal prosecution in a foreign state which has
established that right. Over and above arrest and detention, the mere act of
accusation constitutes an undeniable punishment. 103 Nor can there be any
doubt about the penal nature of condemnation. Forfeiture of property has
traditionally been regarded as severely punitive and was so regarded at the
time of the treaty. 04 Condemnation of the guilty vessel was linked to the
99. 8 TREATIES AND
icA 753 (Miller, 1948).

OTHER INTERNATIONAL

AcTs OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMER-

100. Id. at 755-.6.

101. Id. at 766.

102. Id. at 759.
103. For a contemporary view, see Frank, J., in In re Fried, 161 F.2d 453, 458 (2d
Cir. 1947): "[A] wrongful indictment is no laughing matter; often it works a grievous,
irreparable injury to the person indicted. The stigma cannot be easily erased. In the

public mind, the blot on a man's escutcheon, resulting from such a public accusation of

wrongdoing, is seldom wiped out by a subsequent judgment of not guilty. Frequently
the public remembers the accusation, and suspects guilt, even after an acquittal."
104. See the characterization of condemnation proceedings in The Burdett, 9 Pet.
682, 690, 9 L. Ed. 273 (U.S. 1835) : "This prosecution . . . is a highly penal one, and
the penalty should not be inflicted unless the infractions of the law should be established

beyond reasonable doubt." A modification of the Supreme Court view of the standard
of proof required in a proceeding in ren to enforce a forfeiture took place well after the
treaty of 1862, without directly overruling The Burdett. See Lilienthal's Tobacco v.
United States, 97 U.S. 237, 24 L. Ed. 901 (1877) ; and United States v. Regan, 232 U.S.
37, 34 Sup. Ct. 213, 58 L. Ed. 494 (1914).
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infliction of the death penalty in "An Act to protect the commerce of the
United States, and punish the crime of piracy," passed in 1819.105 In this
context, at least, it was dubbed "harsh punishment" by the Supreme Court
at a time when the slave trade had long been denominated piracy. 10 6 Against
this background, condemnation by the Mixed Courts embodied the full equivalent of judicial obloquy for crime, as well as a material deprivation, both
commonly accepted ingredients of criminal sanction. 10 7 The conclusion is
inescapable that the treaty of 1862 invoked criminal punishment of formidable
proportions and consciously and deliberately authorized the infliction of this
punishment upon United States citizens by an international tribunal. Senate
approval was "without dissent." 108 Senator Sumner, the chief proponent
of the treaty in the Senate, had demolished any opposition as follows:
"But whatever doubts might have prevailed at an earlier period, when the question
was less understood, it is plain now that this objection is wholly superficial and untenable. . . . To insist that the restrictions of the Constitution, evidently intended for

the national judicature, are applicable to these outlying tribunals, is to limit the treaty
power and to curtail the means of justice. . . . Mixed courts are familiar to International Law, and our country cannot afford to reject them, least of all on a discarded
technicality which would leave us isolated among nations. . . . A moment lost is a
concession to crime."10o

Still other precedents for courts not established under Article I1 (1)
of the Constitution and not subject to the. exact letter of the Bill of Rights
with respect to the conduct of criminal proceedings may be found in various
United States national courts. Consular courts, established by treaty to except
American nationals from certain foreign jurisdiction, offer one example. The
constitutionality of such courts was sustained by the Supreme Court in the
leading case of In re Ross." 0 In this case the defendant was found guilty of
the crime of murder committed aboard an American vessel anchored in
Japanese waters, by an American consular court in Japan and sentenced to
death. The sentence was commuted to life imprisonment and the defendant
shipped to the United States to serve his sentence. Nearly ten years afterwards, the defendant applied for his discharge on habeas corpus on the ground
that the crime was cognizable only before the domestic tribunals of the United
States and that he had been denied the right of trial by jury as guaranteed
by the Constitution. Motion for discharge was denied by the circuit court and
the order was affirmed by a unanimous Supreme Court. While it was clear
105. 3 STAT. 510, 513-14 (1819).
106. The Marianna Flora, 11 Wheat. 1, 40, 6 L. Ed. 405 (U.S. 1826).
107. For the contemporary view of the scope of sanctions, see DESsiON, CRIAINAL
LAW, ADMINISTRATION

AND PUBLIC ORDER

(1948);

MANNHEIM,,

CRIMINAL JUSTICE

AND SOCIAL RECONSTRUcTION (1946) ; VON HENTIG, PUNISHMENT (1937) and Dession,
Sanctions, Law and Public Order, I VAND. L. REv. 8 (1947).
108. 4 PIERCE, MEMOIRS AND LETTERS OF CHARLES SUINER 68 (1893).

109. 6 SUMNER, WORKS 483-85 (1874).
110. 140 U.S. 453. 11 Sup. Ct. 897, 35 L. Ed. 581 (1891).
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that United States courts would have had jurisdiction over the offense, no
improper jurisdiction, it was held, had been exercised by the consular court.
Patently, the jurisdiction given to United States courts over such offenses
by the Constitution, was not exclusive of lawful jurisdiction, residing elsewhere. Nor was violence done to the Bill of Rights in subjecting the defendant
to a procedure at variance from that obtaining within the United States. He
had been accorded the elements of fairness under the federal legislation
establishing consular courts in pursuance of treaty obligations:
"The jurisdiction of the consular tribunal .

.

. is to be exercised .

.

. in accordance

with the laws of the United States; and of course in pursuance of them the accused
will have an opportunity of examining the complaint against him, or will be presented
with a copy stating the offense he has committed, will be entitled to be confronted
with the witnesses against him and to cross-examine them, and to have the benefit
of counsel; and indeed, will have the benefit of all the provisions necessary to secure
a fair trial before the consul and his associates. The only complaint of this legislation
made by counsel is that, in directing the trial to be had before the consul and associates
•.. it does not require a previous presentment or indictment by a grand jury, and does
not give to the accused a petit jury .... It is not pretended that the prisoner did not
have, in other respects, a fair trial in the consular court." "'

Military commissions, commonly justified by the exigencies of national
security, offer another example. For present purposes it is not necessary to
attempt to mark out the exact conditions under which such commissions are
constitutional or the precise scope of their jurisdiction; it suffices to indicate
that such commissions have been held constitutional on many occasions to try
citizens and aliens, civilians and soldiers, for a great variety of offenses." 2
The conspirators who plotted Lincoln's assassination 113 and the eight saboteurs of World War II were so tried." 4 It is traditional that the regular civil
courts both decline direct review of the judgments of such military commissions and confine themselves when considering collateral attack by way of
habeas corpus to questions of "jurisdiction." 115 Only very recently in certain
court martial cases have some lower federal courts begun to impose tests of
substantial fairness upon military tribunals. 116 In the classic Civil War case
111. 140 U.S. at 470.
112. FAIRMAN, ThE LAW OF MARTIAL RULE c. 10 (2d ed. 1943); WIENER, A
PRACTICAL MANUAL Or MARTIAL LAW C. 8 (1940). For more controversial issues see

Anthony, Hawaiian Martial Law in the Supreme Court, 57 YALE L.J. 27 (1947);
Fairman, The Supreme Court on Military Jurisdiction: Martial Rule in Hawaii and the
Yamashita Case, 59 HARV. L. Rav. 833 (1946) ; Frank, Ex parte Milligan v. The Five
Companies: Martial Law in Hawaii, 44 COL. L. REV. 638 (1944).
113. See Trial of the Conspirators to Assassinate President Lincoln, 8 Am. State
Trials 25-652 (1865); Ex parte Mudd, 17 Fed. Cas. 954, No. 9,899 (S.D. Fla. 1868).
114. Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 63 Sup. Ct. 1, 87 L. Ed. 3 (1942).
115. Kaplan, Constitutional Limitations on Trials by Military Commissions, 92 U.
OF PA. L. Rv. 119 (1943) ; Stein, Judicial Review of Determinations of Federal Military Tribunals, 11 BROOxLYN L. REv. 30 (1941) ; cf. fi re Vidal, 179 U.S. 126, 127, 21
Sup. Ct. 48, 45 L. Ed. 118 (1900) ; Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 63 Sup. Ct. 1, 87 L. Ed.
3 (1942) ; n re Yamashita, 317 U.S. 1, 66 Sup. Ct. 340, 90 L. Ed. 449 (1946).
116. Note, 13 U. OF CHl. L. REV. 494 (1946). An as yet unpublished paper by Leon
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of Ex parte Vallandigham,1 7 the claim was that, the defendant charged with
disloyal -utterance, "had been arrested without due process of law, without a
warrant from any judicial officer; that he was then in a military prison, and
had been served with a charge and specifications, as in a court-martial or
military commission; that he was not either in the land or naval forces of
the United States, nor in the militia in the actual service of the United States,
and, therefore, not triable for any cause by any such court; that he was subject, by the express terms of the Constitution, to arrest only by due process of
law or judicial warrant . . . ; that he was entitled to be tried on an indictment or presentment of a grand jury. . . ." 11 Only the legal conclusions of

this claim were denied by the government. The Supreme Court held that the
acts of the military commission were not "judicial" in the sense of Article
III (1) of the Constitution and that there was no "original jurisdiction" in
the Supreme Court to "review or reverse" the commission's proceedings." 9
The most important example is, however, to be found in state court
procedure within the United States. 120 With individual justices invoking
either "independent determination" of substantive due process or Fourteenth
Amendment "selective" or "in toto" incorporation of the rest of the Bill of
Rights, the Supreme Court assumes to set national standards for our state
court procedures; but it is now clear that these standards do not, despite the
literal universality of various parts of the Bill of Rights, require the states,
even when exercising jurisdiction concurrent with the federal courts over
events within the scope of federal power, to adopt the specific institutional
practices constitutionally required of the regular federal courts.121 It is enough
Alexander, third-year student in the Yale Law School, collects a number of such lower
court opinions.
117. 1 Wall. 243, 17 L. Ed. 589 (U.S. 1863).

118. 1 Wall. at 246.

119. Id. at 253. We cite this case, not to approve it or to suggest that on its facts

a military commission would today be held to have jurisdiction, but only to indicate the
latitude the Supreme Court has allowed to military commissions in matters of procedure.
120. Another example that might be adduced is that of the territorial courts. Thus

in Hawaii v. Mankichi, 190 U.S. 197, 23 Sup. Ct. 787, 47 L. Ed. 1016 (1902), Mr. Justice Brown, for the Court, wrote: "'We would even go farther, and say that most, if not

all, the privileges and immunities contained in the bill of rights of the Constitution were
intended to apply from the moment of annexation; but we place our decision of this case
upon the ground that the two rights alleged to be violated in this case are not fundamental in their nature, but concern merely a method of procedure which sixty years of
practice had shown to be suited to the conditions of the islands, and well calculated to
conserve the rights of their citizens to their lives, their property and their well-being."

190 U.S. at 217-18.

121. For discussion and collection of cases see Green, The Bill of Rights, The Four-

tcenth Amendment and theSupreme Court, 46 Micit. L. REv. 869 (1948); Green, The
Supreme Court, The Bill of Rights and the States, 97 U. oF PA. L. Rav. 608 (1949);

Boskey and Pickering, Federal Restrictions on State Criminal Procedure, 13 U. OF CHI.
L. Rav. 266 (1945) ; 96 U. OF PA. L. REv. 272 (1947). It appears even that Mr. Justice
Black, the principal proponent of the Fourteenth Amendment's incorporation of the
Bill of Rights in toto, and the justices who agree with him, might be able, consistently

with their position, to reject some specific institutional practices as archaisms. See Note,
58 YALE L.J. 268, 277 n.53 (1949). The opinions are somewhat ambiguous on this point.
Note Mr. Justice Black's concurrence in Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 39-40, 69 Sup.
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that state procedure complies with the fundamental fairness for which such
specific institutional practices were shaped. "The State is free," wrote Chief
Justice Hughes for a unanimous Court, "to regulate the procedure of its
courts in accordance with its own conceptions of policy, unless in so doing
it 'offends some principle of justice so rooted in the traditions and conscience
No specific form of trial
of our people as to be ranked as fundamental.'" 1122
is held essential and many deviations from required federal practice are
allowed to escape the Court's ban. 1 23 Concise summary appears in the opinion
of Mr. Justice Cardozo for a unanimous Court in Palko v. Connecticut, which
allowed Connecticut officials somewhat greater freedom from the double
jeopardy restraint than might have been granted to federal officials:
"The right to trial by jury and the immunity from prosecution except as the result
of an indictment may have value and importance. Even so, they are not of the very
essence of a scheme of ordered liberty. To abolish them is not to violate a 'principle
of justice so rooted in the traditions and conscience of our people as to be ranked as
fundamental.' . . . Few would be so narrow or provincial as to maintain that a fair
and enlightened system of justice would be impossible without them. What is true of
jury trials and indictments is true also, as the cases show, of the immunity from compulsory self-incrimination. . . . This too might be lost, and justice still be done."

The cases in recent years are legion and we invoke them, not to approve of
specific decisions, but rather to indicate contemporary attitudes in the interpretation of the relevant sections of the Constitution.

2

It appears reasonable, therefore, to conclude that the establishment of
an international court, with jurisdiction over crimes against world security
wherever committed, would pose no insurmountable constitutional difficulties
for the United States and would be well within our national traditions. So
long as the charter and procedures of such a court were required to conform
to the substance of due process, our participation would be attended by no
dangers of exposing individuals to arbitrary power. With all deference to
parochialism, it may be added that in the proceedings before the International
Military Tribunal at Nuremberg, representing an amalgam of national procedures, the defendant was not infrequently the beneficiary of foreign safeCt. 1359 (1948), admitting evidence though obtained through unreasonable search and
seizure, and in -irota v. MacArthur, 338 U.S. 197, 69 Sup. Ct. 197 (1948).
122. Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278, 285, 56 Sup. Ct. 461, 80 L. Ed. 682 (1936).
123. For summary see articles cited note 121, supra.
124. 302 U.S. 319, 325, 58 Sup. Ct. 149, 82 L. Ed. 288 (1937).
125. In Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 69 Sup. Ct. 1359 (1948), Mr. Justice Frankfurter, for the Court, offers eloquent statement of an attitude indispensable to survival:
"Due process of law thus conveys neither formal nor fixed nor narrow requirements. It
is the compendious expression for all those rights which the courts must enforce because
they are basic to our free society. But basic rights do not become petrified as of any
one time, even though, as a matter of human experience, some may not too rhetorically
be called eternal verities. It is of the very nature of a free society to advance in its
standards of what is deemed reasonable and right. Representing as it does a living principle, due process is not confined within a permanent catalogue of what may at a given
time be deemed the limits or the essentials of fundamental rights." 338 U.S. at 27.
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guards. Thus Mr. Justice Jackson has pointed out that "as to advance information and copies and help and service" the defendants received "much
more than any citizen of the United States gets on trial in the courts of the
United States." 126
III
The charge of the Bar spokesmen that implementation of the Genocide
Convention would convert crimes traditionally "domestic" into federal or
international crimes and hence "deprive the states of a great field of criminal
jurisprudence" is groundless. Genocide is not a traditional domestic crime
and has not enjoyed a "great field" of practice within the United States; and
murder will remain murder, punishable as before, even after genocide becomes federal or even international crime. Genocide may include some of
the same events as murder or lynching or other violence traditionally regarded
as "domestic" crime but it also requires something more. What distinguishes
genocide from domestic crime is the necessity for proof of a specific intent
"to destroy in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group
as such." 127 What the Genocide Convention does is to provide a new remedy
when such intent and the prescribed acts of destruction can be shown. Unless
deliberately planned as part of a grand design for race extermination, lynching and rioting or other local violence, would not constitute genocide and
could not be punished as such.128 This differentiation between crimes by
different requirements of specific intent, which must be proved and cannot be
presumed, 129 is traditional in American law and has been found to afford
defendants adequate safeguards against abuse. 1 0 The history of this country
reveals no record of mass-murder, lynchings or riots as planned instruments
of group extermination. So far from projecting itself into the field of our
126. See 2 TRIAL OF THE MAJOR WAR CRIMINALS 438
JACKSON, THE NtRNBERG CASE vi-vii (1947). In Hurtado v.

(Nuremberg, 1947). Cf.
California, 110 U.S. 516,
531, 4 Sup. Ct. 111, 292, 28 L. Ed. 232 (1884), Mr. Justice Matthews, for the Court
remarked: ". . . while we take just pride in the principles and institutions of the common law, we are not to forget that in lands where other systems of jurisprudence prevail,
the ideas and processes of civil justice are also not unknown. Due process of law, in
spite of the absolutism of continental governments, is not alien to that code which survived the Roman Empire as the foundation of modern civilization in Europe."
127. Art. II.
128. To the obvious difficulty in proving the necessary specific intent, may be added
the well known fact that mobs are characterized by a relaxation of conscious controls,
comparable to that achieved in intoxication. CANTRIL, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF SOCIAL
MOVEMENTS (1941); MARTIN, THE BEHAVIOUR OF CROWDS (1920); cf. LEE AND
HUMPHREY, RACE RIOT (1943).
129. See MILLER, CRIMINAL LAW 60 (1934): "When by the common law or by
statute a specific intent is essential to a crime, such an intent cannot be presumed from
the mere commission of the act, but it must be expressly proved." Cf. 1 WHARTON,
CRIMINAL LAW 200 (11th ed., Kerr, 1912).
130. Specific intent has long been an essential element of a vast catalogue of crime.
See MILLER, CRIMINAL LAW 59-60 (1934). Its effect has been to add heavily to the
burden of proof upon the government. See Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 91, 65 Sup.
Ct. 1031, 89 L. Ed. 1495, 162 A.L.R. 1330 (1945). It has been regarded as a technique
of mitigation. See HALL, GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINAL LAW 447-48 (1947).
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domestic crime, the Genocide Convention by its terms severely restricts its
operation to situations of mass extermination, exemplified in recent times
only in the totalitarian areas of Europe and Asia.
The fear by the Bar spokesmen of "endless confusion in the dual system
of the United States" is, even assuming genocide to become a common practice in this country, no more real. It is belied by a long history of effective
federal and state cooperation, including concurrent criminal jurisdiction over
the same acts, to secure both national and local interests. 13 1 Federal legislation
is commonly invoked to protect the national interest notwithstanding previous
state regulation of the same events and, conversely, state legislation remains
competent to secure local interests save where the field is exclusively preempted by the Congress. 32 With respect to concurrent criminal jurisdiction,
the constitutional point was well made by Chief justice Taft, speaking for a
unanimous Court, in United States v. Lanza (upholding prosecution under
the National Prohibition Act for identical acts for which a judgment had been
entered against the defendants under state statute) :
"We have here two sovereignties, deriving power from different sources, capable of
dealing with the same subject-matter within the same territory ...
It follows that an act denounced as a crime by both national and state sovereignties
is an offense against the peace and dignity of both and may be punished by each.
.. . Here the same act was an offense against the State of Washington because a
violation of its law, and also an offense against the United States under the National
Prohibition Act! The defendants thus committed two different offenses by the same
act, and a conviction by a court of Washington of the offense against that State is
not a conviction of the different offense against the United States. .

. .""

Similarly, in holding a defendant answerable for the same act of "harboring
and secreting a Negro slave" to federal and state jurisdiction alike, the
Supreme Court, through Mr. Justice Grier, said:
"Every citizen of the United States is also a citizen of a State or territory. He may be
said to owe allegiance to two sovereigns, and may be liable to punishment for an
infraction of the laws of either. The same act may be an offense or transgression of
the laws of both. Thus, an assault upon the marshal of the United States, and hindering him in the execution of legal process, is a high offense against the United States,
131. The case for such cooperation is well met in United States v. McClellan, 127
Fed. 971 (S.D. Ga. 1904). Sustaining the right of federal prosecution for violation of
the federal antipeonage statute enacted pursuant to the Thirteenth Amendment, over
the argument, reminiscent of that of the bar leaders in the case of genocide, that it infringed upon state jurisdiction, the court said: "it is urged that the courts of the state
have jurisdiction of this crime, under the name of 'kidnapping and false imprisonment.'
So they have, and no word we say ought to discourage their officers in the performance
of their duty to prosecute and convict. So they have jurisdiction of the burglary of a
post office, but that does not nullify the jurisdiction of the national courts to try the same
crime. The jurisdiction of both courts is here concurrent, and no man would be quicker
than the presiding judge of this court to applaud righteous convictions for these crimes
in the courts of the state." Id. at 979.
132. Grant, The Scope and Nature of Concurrent Power, 34 COL. L. REv. 995 (1934).
133. 260 U.S. 377, 382, 43 Sup. Ct. 141, 67 L. Ed. 314 (1922); cf. Hebert v.
Louisiana, 272 U.S. 312, 47 Sup. Ct. 103, 71 L. Ed. 270 (1926).
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for which the perpetrator is liable to punishment; and the same act may be also a
gross breach of the peace of the State, a riot, assault, or a murder, and subject the
same person to a punishment, under the state laws, for a misdemeanor or felony. That
either or both may (if they see fit) punish such an offender, cannot be doubted." '

Almost unwavering in its position,135 the Supreme Court has upheld concur36
cattle inspecrent jurisdiction on matters as diverse as election controls,
39
38
i3 7
derailing a
forgery,
lands,
public
of
obstruction
involving
assault
tion,

42
and the
train carrying federal mail, 140 sedition, 141 gambling transactions,
143
regulation of motor transport.' The state courts,. for their part, have accepted the doctrine in a great variety of cases, of which a random sampling
146
forgery, 47 and
includes manslaughter, 144 larceny, 145 post-office burglary,
uttering counterfeit banknotes. 48 Appropriate recognition of national and
local interdependences appears in an opinion of the New Jersey Court, upholding a state prosecution for the crime of sedition directed against the
federal government:

"In the pending case the crime is sedition. Primarily sedition against the United States

134. Moore v. Illinois, 14 How. 13, 20, 14 L. Ed. 306 (U.S. 1852).
135. In what now appear to have been a few aberrational decisions, the theory that
state and national governments could separately punish the same criminal act was rejected
by the Supreme Court. See, e.g., Houston v. Moore, 5 Wheat. 1, 5 L. Ed. 19 (U.S.

1820) ; Matter of Heff, 197 U.S. 488, 25 Sup. Ct. 506, 49 L. Ed. 848 (1905). The Supreme
Court has since definitely abandoned this position. See Grant, The Scope and Nature of

Concurrent Power, 34 COL. L. REv. 995, 1013 (1934).
136. See Ex parte Siebold, 100 U.S. 371, 387-89, 25 L. Ed. 717 (1879) : "As to the
supposed incompatibility of independent sanctions and punishments imposed by the two
governments for the enforcement of the duties required of the officers of election, and for
their protection in the performance of those duties, the same considerations apply. While
the State will retain the power of enforcing such of its own regulations as are not
superseded by those adopted by Congress, it cannot be disputed that if Congress has
[E]ach governpower to make regulations it must have the power to enforce them ....
ment punishes for violation of duty to itself only. Where a person owes a duty to two
sovereigns, he is amenable to both for its performance; and either may call him to account." Cf. Ex parte Clarke, 100 U.S. 399, 25 L. Ed. 715 (1879).
137. Asbell v. Kansas, 209 U.S. 251, 28 Sup. Ct. 485, 52 L. Ed. 778 (1908).
138. McKelvey v. United States, 260 U.S. 353, 43 Sup. Ct. 132, 67 L. Ed. 301 (1922).
139. Cross v. North Carolina, 132 U.S. 131, 10 Sup. Ct. 47, 33 L. Ed. 287 (1889) ;
cf. Pettibone v. United States, 148 U.S. 197, 209, 13 Sup. Ct. 542, 37 L. Ed. 414 (1893).
140. Crossley v. California, 168 U.S. 640, 18 Sup. Ct. 242, 42 L. Ed. 610 (1898).
141. Gilbert v. Minnesota, 254 U.S. 325, 41 Sup. Ct. 125, 65 L. Ed. 287 (1920).
142. Dickson v. Uhlmann Grain Co., 288 U.S. 188, 53 Sup. Ct. 362, 77 L. Ed. 691,
83 A.L.R. 492 (1933).
143. California v. Zook, 336 U.S. 725, 69 Sup. Ct. 841 (1949).
144. See People v. Welch, 141 N.Y. 266, 275, 36 N.E. 328, 330 (1894) (dealing with
manslaughter and arising out of a tugboat collision) : "The crime of which the defendant
was convicted was primarily a crime against the peace and good order of the state.
It was only a crime against the United States because Congress, in the interest of
navigation, had seen fit to enact a law making one species of homicide, when committed
by an officer, pilot, etc., manslaughter punishable in the courts of the United States.
There is nothing in the enactment itself which makes the jurisdiction exclusive. There
is no repugnacy in the existence of concurrent jurisdiction in the state courts to punish
under its laws this grade of homicide."
145. State v. Coss, 12 Wash. 673, 42 Pac. 127 (1895).
146. People v. Burke, 161 Mich. 397, 126 N.W. 446 (1910).
147. Jett v. Commonwealth, 18 Gratt. 933 (Va. 1867).
148. People v. Fury, 279 N.Y. 433, 98 N.E.2d 650 (1939); cf. White v. Commonwealth, 4 Binn. 418 (Pa. 1812).
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is a crime against the federal government, which is the direct subject of attack; but
under our system the federal and state governments are so closely interwoven that
an attack on the former may imperil the existence of the latter." 140

It is, furthermore, illusion to urge, as the Bar spokesmen do, that ratification of the Genocide Convention would effect any real, much less a "revolutionary," shift in constitutional power from the states to the nation. The
"protection of personal rights" is not, except in terms of simple quantity of
administration, now "vested principally in the States of the American Union,"
as Mr. Finch urges. 50 There are a Bill of Rights, including a Fourteenth
Amendment, establishing national standards which the states cannot contravene, and wide Congressional powers for the positive promotion of human
rights in the federal constitution.' 51 The clear trend of decision in the Supreme
Court, in response to a growing sense of national interdependence with
respect to all rights, is to give wider and wider scope to these federally
secured individual rights and to the positive federal powers.152 The same
forces that are operating on a global scale to make the world one for security,
economic development, human rights, enlightenment and other values, are
operating even more intensely to make the nation one for these same values,
and constitutional interpretation and practice move, without violence to the
words of the document or framers' intent, at an accelerating tempo toward a
structure rationally designed to secure the national interest153 Ratification of
the Genocide Convention would serve only to put into practice powers that
the federal government now possesses, to seek the honoring on a global scale
of standards of human decency which within this country we have always
professed and honored, both as nation and locality.
The suggestion of the Bar spokesmen that the provisions of the Genocide
Convention making "direct and public incitement to commit genocide" punishable might be so applied as to infringe freedom of speech and press is uinnecessary fearfulness. The Congressional act which implements the Convention can, if regarded as necessary, make clear what is meant by incitement in
this context. Incitement or solicitation to commit crime has traditionally been
punishable as crime by both common law and statute in this country. 15 4 Thus
149. State v. Tachin, 92 N.J.L. 269, 106 Atl. 145, 147 (1919).
150. 43 Am. J. INT'L L. 732, 735 (1949).

151. See generally, CARR, FEDERAL PROTECTION OF CIVIL RIGHTS: Qt.;:sT FOR A
SwoRD (1947); KONviTZ, THE CONSTITUTION AND CIVIL RiIITS (1947); To SEcvuIE
REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT'S COMMITTEE ON CIVIL RIGHTS (1947);
Boskey and Pickering, Federal Restrictions on State Criminal Procedure, 13 U. OF Cur.
L. Rrv. 266 (1946); Note, 57 YALE L.J. 855 (1948).
152. For summary and citations, see McDougal and Leighton, supra note 26, at
111-14.
153. Lusky, Minority Rights and the Public Interest, 52 YALE L.J. 1 (1942)
McDougal and Leighton, supra note 26, at 110.
154. See MILLER, CRIMNAL LAW 105, 106 (1934); Note, Solicitations, 41 DIcK.
L. REV. 225 (1937); cf. United States v. Galleanni, 245 Fed. 977 (D. Mass. 1917);
State v. Schleifer, 99 Conn. 432, 121 AtI. 805 (1923), and cases cited therein.
THESE RIGHTS:
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in Gitlow v. New York, 155 the famous "criminal anarchy" case after World
War I which established that "freedom of speech and of the press-which are
protected by the First Amendment from abridgment by Congress-are among
the fundamental personal rights and 'liberties' protected by the due process
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment from impairment by the States," 156 Mr.
Justice Sanford, speaking for the Court, summarized:
"That a State in the exercise of its police power may punish those who abuse
this freedom by utterances inimical to the public welfare, tending to corrupt public
morals, incite to crime, or disturb the public peace, is not open to question." 15-

What is traditional for common crimes can scarcely be oppressive innovation
for mass-murder. Even freedom of communication is not, furthermore, an
absolute in democratic preference: security and human decency must likewise
have their place.' 55
It is no little irony that argument must be made in support of a convention to suppress genocide. "The spectacle," writes a contemporary journal of
opinion, "of modern man explaining his right to existence is an odd one." 159
The Genocide Convention is but one of many interrelated measures in a
world-wide program to secure peace and respect for the dignity of the individual human being.160 Rational appraisal of this Convention requires both a
perspective of the centuries of man's long struggle for freedom and security
by promulgating doctrine and balancing power and a realistic orientation in
the contemporary interdependences of peoples everywhere in securing and
maintaining a minimum of security and basic human rights.' 6 ' Even in a
155.
156.
157.
158.

268 U.S. 652, 45 Sup. Ct. 625, 69 L. Ed. 1138 (1925).
268 U.S. at 666.
Id. at 667.
See Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 571-72, 62 Sup. Ct. 766,

86 L. Ed. 1031 (1942); Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52, 39 Sup. Ct. 247,
63 L. Ed. 470 (1919). The decision in Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 69 Sup. Ct.
894 (1949), invoked by the Bar spokesmen, raises no difficulties for the Genocide Convention. Mr. Justice Douglas, for the Court, wrote: "That is why freedom of speecl,
though not absolute . . . is nevertheless protected against censorship or punishment,
unless shown likely to produce a clear and present danger of h serious substantive evil
that rises far above public inconvenience, annoyance, or unrest." 337 U.S. at 4. But
mass-murder and the incitement thereto obviously rise above mere "inconvenience,
annoyance, or unrest."
159. The New Yorker, Feb. 11, 1950, p. 56.
160. The relationship between internal mass-murder and external aggression has
already been indicated. See also LEwIN, RESOLVING SOCIAL CONFLICTS, SELECTED PAPZRS
ON GROUP DYN
iAcs 44 (1948): "Millions of helpless children, women, and men have
been exterminated by suffocation or other means in the occupied countries. . . . Tens
of thousands of Germans must have become accustomed to serve as a matter of routine
on the extermination squads or elsewhere in the large organization dedicated to this
purpose. This systematic extermination has been carried out with the expressed purpose
of securing in the generations to come German supremacy in the surrounding countries.
For the question of international relations and of safeguarding the peace, it is particularly dangerous that such killing is considered the natural right of the victor over
the vanquished or of the Herrenvolk over lower races." Cf. FROmm, ESCAPE FROM
FREEDOm, 207-39 (1941).
161. See McDougal and Leighton, supra note 26, for the outlines of such perspective
and orientation. Mr. Justice Rutledge, in a characteristic dissent in In re Yamashita,
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world where nations are feverishly inventing and creating new instruments
for mass-murder of hitherto unimaginable scope, it may still serve some purpose for peoples seeking survival to take this opportunity to restate their
demand for fundamental human dignity, to reannounce their consensus on
behalf of all mankind, and to recelebrate the identifications of all free peoples
with each other. Unless this ideal is kept constantly at the focus of public
attention there may be no fire in men's hearts to preserve it.
327 U.S. 1, 81, 66 Sup. Ct. 340, 90 L. Ed. 449 (1946), invokes .2 THE COMPLETE WRITINGS

OF THOMAS PAINE 588 (Foner ed. 1945) : "He that would make his own liberty secure
must guard even his enemy from oppression; for if he violates this duty he establishes
a precedent that will reach to himself."

